October 14, 2007
Come to Me..by David Lindsley
Mary, Mother of God…Mother Mary, Save the Children: we interred a country suffering great oppression and now the children are being violated…where is the Justice of men leading us…
The 15th, St. Theresa of Jesus; The 16th, St. Hedwig, St. Margaret Mary Alacoque, National Boss Day; The 17th, St. Ignatius of Antioch; The 18th, St. Luke; The 19th, St. John deBrebeuf, Isaac Joques, and their companions; The 20th, St. Paul of the Cross; BVM.
The Praises of the Kingdom of the Divine Will; Second Week; Day of Mary Most Holy…Morning Prayer
Psalm 2; Vol VIII, December 27m 1908… Page 100
Jesus…When I was taking milk from the breast of my dearest mother, together with the milk I took the love of her heart; and it was more love that I took than milk.
…While I was nursing- because I heard her say to me, I love you, I love you, Oh Son! – I repeated to her, I love you, I love you, oh Mother!
…Nor was I alone in this, because to my, I love you, the Father and the Holy Spirit replied, I love you, oh Mother of my Son! Said the Father; I love you, my Immaculate Spouse! Said the Holy Spirit.
…All of creation, the angels, the saints, the sun, the drops of water, the plants, the flowers, all the elements ran to be near my I love you and replied, I love you, oh Mother of our God, in the love of our Creator!
Meadows Dance by Shirley Novak
…My mother saw all this and was overwhelmed by it. She could not find even a little space where she did not hear me say that I loved her. Her love was left behind mine and almost alone, and she repeated, I love you, I love you, but she could never keep up with mine; because the love of the creature has its limits and its time: my love is uncreated, unending and eternal.
…The same thing happens to every soul when it says to me, I love you: I also repeat I love you; and with me is all of creation to love it in my love.
…Oh, if creatures only understood what good, what honor they came by just by saying to me, I love You! It would be enough to know only this; that a God by their side honors them with his reply, I love you.
Courageous Acts by Iraqi Christians
Celebrating an Ordination and First Communions
BAGHDAD, Iraq, JULY 9, 2007 (Zenit.org).- In spite of persecution, ordinations and first Holy Communions bring signs of hope for the Christian community.
On July 7, in the church of Mar Addai, Father Ephram Gallyana, 31, was ordained a Chaldean priest at a Mass celebrated by Bishop Faraj Rahho of Mosul, AsiaNews reported.
The new priest is from the Diocese of Mosul, but for security reasons, was ordained in Karamles, Iraq, the same settlement where the funeral of Father Ragheed Aziz Ganni and the three murdered subdeacons was held on June 4.
Father Ephram placed a cross of yellow roses on the tomb of Father Ragheed with the inscription, “from your brother, Ephram Gallyana.”
The new priest pledged to “continue the work of Father Ragheed.”
On Sunday, 59 children received their first Holy Communion in Baghdad.
Dressed like novice monks and sisters, the children went to the Syrian-Catholic Church of Our Lady of Salvation.
“I prayed that Jesus returns my father safe,” said 11-year-old Matti. His father was kidnapped nine months ago, and has not been heard from since.
Another kidnapping last Friday added to the climate of fear for Christians in Iraq. Four lay people, among them a father and a son, disappeared in Kirkuk. Original reports said that a priest was among the victims, but it was later confirmed that all the missing persons are lay.
“Do not succumb to the threats of the evil-doers,” was the appeal made by the Syrian Catholic Archbishop of the capital, Athanase Matti Matoka.
“Many churches in Baghdad have cancelled their annual first communion ceremonies to avoid possible attacks but we decided to go ahead with our program,” he explained.
The archbishop said, “The children have been meeting here for more than a month despite the danger.”
Continued from July, 2007…All about Sunnis …now
Part II Religious Differences in the Country of Iraq…Shias
Shias in Iraq
Islam, as it is practiced in Iraq, is closely tied to Arab culture. Shiism in Iraq is heavily influenced by Arab identity and thus differs from the version followed in Persian Iran. Many of Iraq’s tribes converted to Shiism in the 19th century, partly in response to Ottoman settlement policies that disrupted the tribal order. Shia rituals and law helped tribesmen cope with their more complex daily life. The rapid conversion of Iraq’s tribes to Shiism did not permeate the former social and moral values of the tribesmen. During the Iran-Iraq War, Iraqi Shia for the most part chose their Arab identity over their religious one.
Historically, Iraq has been the heartland of the global Shia community. For the most part, Shia Arabs have made attempts to accommodate their religious identity to the framework of the Iraqi state. Although Shia resent the ruling Sunni minority’s repeated questioning of their loyalty and Arab bona fides, the Shia community has never unified behind a Shia cause. A variety of views about politics and religion contradicts the image of a monolithic, radical, and pro-Iranian Shia community. Although there are strong cultural and familial links between Iraqi and Iranian Shia, Arab identity and national sentiment remain powerful influences within the community.
A significant practice of Shia Islam is that of visiting the shrines of Imams both in Iraq and in Iran. These include the tomb of Imam Ali in An Najaf and that of his son Imam Husayn in Karbala since both are considered major Shia martyrs. Before the 1980 Iran-Iraq War, tens of thousands went each year. The Iranians made it a central aim of their war effort to wrest these holy cities from the Iraqis. Other principal pilgrimage sites in Iraq are the tombs of the Seventh and Ninth Imams at Kazimayn, near Baghdad, and in Iran, the tomb of the Eighth Imam in Mashhad and that of his sister in Qom. Such pilgrimages originated in part from the difficulty and expense in the early days of making the hajj to Mecca.
Commemorating the martyrdom of Husayn, killed near Karbala in A.D. 680 during a battle with troops supporting the Ummayad caliph, there are processions in the Shia towns and villages of southern Iraq on the tenth of Muharram (Ashura), the anniversary of his death. Ritual mourning (taaziya) is performed by groups of men of five to twenty each. Contributions are solicited in the community to pay transportation for a local group to go to Karbala for taaziya celebrations forty days after Ashura. There is a great rivalry among groups from different places for the best performance of the passion plays.
In the villages, religious readings occur throughout Ramadan and Muharram. The men may gather in the mudhif (tribal guesthouse), the suq (market), or a private house. Women meet in homes. The readings are led either by a mumin (a man trained in a religious school in An Najaf) or by a mullah who has apprenticed with an older specialist. It is considered the duty of shaykhs, elders, prosperous merchants, and the like to sponsor these readings, or qirayas. Under the monarchy these public manifestations were discouraged, as they emphasized grievances against the Sunnis.
In 1722, Persian Shia clerics emigrated to southern Iraq under the protection of the Iranian government in an area of Iraq where Ottoman control was weak. The emigration shifted the center of Shia scholarship from Iran to Iraq, increasing the importance of Iraq and its Shia shrine cities among the larger Shia community.
The Sunni Ottomans considered the Shia clerics to be a potential fifth column because of their ties with Iran. To counter this Shia influence, the Ottomans placed the Sunni Arabs in positions of government in Iraq, a practice that was continued by the British. The predominance of the Sunni in the government continued throughout the Ba’ath period.
In 1920, a tribal revolt began against the British in the south of Iraq, incited largely by the Shia clerics. Many of the Shia clerics were Persian and felt threatened by British policies that endangered their influence among the local population and resented the occupation of Iraq by Christian infidels. The revolt was put down by the British, who saw the ability of the Shia clerics to incite a far-reaching rebellion as a danger both to them and to the young Iraqi state.
From the late 1940s to the mid-1950s, the Shia made up the majority of the membership of the Iraqi Communist Party (ICP). The Shia ulema later condemned the ICP as an atheist party, which caused Shia to withdraw support, a factor in the successful coup against President Qasim in 1963.
The Iraqi Shia later became supporters of the al-Dawa and al-Mujahidin parties. The al-Dawa party was guided by the philosophy of Iraqi Shia Ayatollah Sayyid Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr, a leading figure in the Shia Islamist movement until his execution by the government in 1980.
Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, a Persian and the leader of the 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran, had taught and preached in Najaf after being exiled from Iran by the Shah in 1964. Khomeini’s presence in Iraq had an impact on the Shia political movement in Iraq, but his influence in that movement was overshadowed by that of Sayyid Mohammed Baqir al-Sadr, a native Iraqi and an Arab.
Shia Leadership
A marjah is the highest authority on religion and law in Shiism. Where a difference in opinion exist between the Marjah, Aalims (Religious Scholar) try to provide different opinions. Four senior Grand Ayatollahs [Ayat Allah] constitute the Religious Institution (al-Hawzah al-`Ilmiyyah) in Najaf, the preeminent seminary center for the training of Shiite clergymen.
Taqlid means acting according to the opinion of the jurist (mujtahid) who has all the necessary qualification to be emulated. So you do what the mujtahid’s expert opinion says you should do, and refrain from what his expert opinion says you should refrain from, without any research [in Islamic sources] on your part. It is as though you have placed the responsibility of your deeds squarely on his shoulders. Among the conditions which must be found in a jurist (mujtahid) who can be followed is that he must be the most learned (al-a’lam) jurist of his time and the most capable in deriving the religious laws from the appropriate sources.
There are generally six ranks among Shi’ite clerics. The highest, grand ayatollah means “great sign of God”. In the past, there were usually no more than five grand ayatollahs in the Shi’ite Islamic world. Today however it is suspected that there are at least seven and possibly more. Under grand ayatollah is ayatollah (”sign of God”). Below ayatollah is the rank of hojat al Islam, which is Arabic for “authority on Islam”. Next is mubellegh al risala or “carrier of the message”. While mujtahid often refers to clerics in general, it is also a specific rank, which denotes one has graduated from a religious seminary. At the bottom of the ladder are religious students, talib ilm. Besides the obvious factors such as graduation to be promoted to mujtahid, promotion in the ranks is a rather subjective matter. Two important factors behind promotion are the size and quality of one’s student following and authorship of scholarly works on Islam.
As of late 2002 there were two generally acknowledged senior Shi’a clerics in Iraq. Prior to the American occupation, Ayatollah Al-Sayyid Ali Al-Seestani [Ali as-Sistani ] had been forbidden to lead prayers and remained under virtual house arrest in Najaf as a result of attempts on his life. Grand Ayatollah Sayed Ali Seestani, the current Shi’a spiritual leader, was attacked in his home in Najaf in November 1996, resulting in the death of one of his employees.
Grand Ayatollah Mohammed Sayeed al-Hakim, another of Iraqi’s most important Shiite clerics, is the uncle of Ayatollah Muhammad Baqir al-Hakim, the leader of the Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq, whose brother, `Abdul Aziz, serves on the Interim Governing Council. But Sa`id is not associated with SCIRI; he is much closer to Sistani. His cousin Grand Ayatollah Muhsin al-Hakim had been the spiritual leader of the Shia world between 1955 and 1970 and served as mentor to the founder of Iran’s Islamic Republic, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini.
The two other living grand ayatollahs, who along with al-Hakim and Sistani comprised the four most powerful clerics in Iraq, are Muhammad Ishaq Fayadh and Bashir Hussein al-Najafi. Both rarely speak on political issues. All are based in the Shi’a seminary — the ‘Hawza’ — in Al-Najaf, which is the highest religious authority of Iraq’s majority Shi’a population. Their followers regard them as sources for religious emulation and their written opinions can carry the force of law.
At the end of the 1991 Gulf War, President George Bush urged Iraqis to topple the Baath regime, but the US did not back the Shiite uprising that ensued in southern Iraq, and the rebels were slaughtered. When the fighters of the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI), headed by Ayatollah Muhammad Baqir al-Hakim, poured over the border from Iran. Fears of Iranian influence over Iraqi Shiites through SCIRI was a decisive factors in the US decision not to support the uprising. Grand Ayatollah Abu Gharib al-Qassem al-Khoei sent his son Ayatollah Abdul Majid al-Khoei to contact the Americans. When he reached French lines he was told Gen. Norman Schwarzkopf, commander of the allied forces, would meet him, but the meeting never took place. Afterwards, Al-Khoei went into exile.
For more than half a century, the school of the late Grand Ayatollah Imam Abul Qassim al-Khoee was an undepletable spring that enriched Islamic thought and knowledge. From his school graduated dozens of jurists, clergymen, and dignitaries who took it upon themselves to continue his ideological path which was full of achievements and sacrifices in the service of the faith, knowledge, and society. Among those are outstanding professors of parochial schools, especially Holy Najaf and Qom. Some of them have attained the level of ‘ijtiihad’- competence to deduce independent legal judgment enabling them to assume the office of supreme religious authority. Others reached lofty levels qualifying them for shouldering the responsibilities of teaching and education. Most distinguished among those figures is His Eminence Grand Ayatullah as-Sayyid Ali al-Hussaini as-Seestani. He ranks among the brightest, the most qualified and knowledgeable of Imam al-Khoee’s former students.
In 1991 Iraqi authorities arrested 108 Shi’a clerics and students, including 95-year-old Grand Ayatollah Abu Gharib al-Qassem al-Khoei, 10 of his family members, and 8 of his aides. Ayatollah al-Khoei subsequently was released; however, he was held under house arrest until his death in August 1992. Ayatollah Hussein Bahr al-Aloom, who was arrested in 1991, had reportedly died under questionable circumstances in June 2001.
The late Grand Ayatollah Muhsin Al-Hakim was the spiritual leader for the Shia world in the period 1955-1970. Grand Ayatollah Abul-Qasim al-Khoei received the mantle of leadership after the death of Grand Ayatollah Muhsin al-Hakim, in 1970. Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, who succeeded Grand Ayatollah Abul-Qasim al-Khoei in 1992, is believed to favor keeping the Iraqi Shi’ite clergy out of politics.
Baath Governmental authorities were associated with a series of previous fatal accidents, apparently engineered, such as the well known case of Sayed Muhammed Taqi al-Khoei, son of the Grand Ayatollah al-Khoei, who died on 21 July 1994 in a suspicious car accident while returning from his weekly visit to Karbala. He was accompanied by his brother-in-law, Amin Khalkhali, his six-year-old nephew and his driver, when they crashed into an unlit truck blocking the divided highway.
Since January 1998, the killings of three internationally respected clerics and an attempt on the life of a fourth have been attributed widely to government agents by international human rights activists, other governments, and Shi’a clergy in Iran and Lebanon.
Ayatollah Shaykh Murtada al-Burujerdi was shot dead in the evening of 21 April 1998 while he was walking home with two companions after he had led congregational evening prayers at the shrine of Imam Ali. Following the 1991 Shi’a uprising in southern Iraq, Ayatollah al-Burujerdi, who at that time had been arrested for three days, began leading the daily prayers in the sacred enclosure of Imam Ali. As well as being a leader of the congregational prayers, Ayatollah al-Burujerdi was a serious candidate for the position of Marja. It was reported that Ayatollah al-Burujerdi had been asked by the Iraqi authorities to give up his post as leader of the prayers at the shrine of Imam Ali, but he refused.
Grand Ayatollah Shaykh Mirza Ali al-Gharawi (68 years old) was assassinated on 18 June 1998 in his car on the route between the holy cities of Karbala and Najaf. He was accompanied by his son-in-law, driver and another companion. According to information from persons claiming to have been witnesses, the car of Ayatollah al-Gharawi was stopped and all four passengers of the car were then shot dead on the spot. Ayatollah al-Gharawi was a well-respected religious scholar and was also a senior spiritual leader (or Marja) of Shi’a Muslims.
Ayatollah Sheikh Bashir al Hussaini escaped an attempt on his life in January 1999.
Grand Ayatollah Mohammad al-Sadr [aged 66], the leading Shi`a cleric in Iraq, was assassinated in Najaf while driving home on the evening of 19 February 1999 along with his two sons and chief assistants, Mustafa and Mu`ammal, and their driver. The government had recognized al-Sadr as grand ayatollah in 1992, but in the months preceding his death he had begun distancing himself from the government in Friday sermons and urging people, against government wishes, to attend mass prayer gatherings. Following the murder of Ayatollah al-Sadr there were widespread reports of at least four days of heavy clashes between protesters and security forces in heavily Shi`a neighborhoods of Baghdad such as Medinat al-Thawra and in majority Shi`a cities such as Karbala, Nasriyya, Najaf, and Basra in which scores were killed and hundreds arrested. According to Iraq’s opposition groups, the latest killings unleashed a mini-insurrection. They claim the army besieged Najaf. United Nations observers, monitoring fooddistribution in Iraq, passed through Najaf on the day of the supposed siege and noticed nothing unusual.
In mid-April 2003 Ayatollah Mohammed Baqir al-Hakim, who had lived in exile in Iran for 23 years, and Ayatollah Abdul Majid al-Khoei, who had lived in exile in London for 12 years, both returned to the holy city of Najaf to organize their followers. The two men were leaders of the most important Shiite families in Iraq. Each man’s father had served as the supreme religious authority in the Shiite world for more than 20 years. They had both been betrayed by America after the 1991 Gulf War. And by the end of August 2003 both had been assassinated.
At the beginning of the American invasion of Iraq in March 2003, Baqir al-Hakim instructed SCIRI elements in Basra, Najaf, Karbala and other cities not to start an uprising or support the US-led coalition. To supporters Baqir al-Hakim’s arrival was the Khomeini-like return from exile of a man who is due - at the very least - a place among the Iraqis who will form the country’s interim leadership. To his opponents Hakim had been away too long and is too close to Tehran, where he lived while his people fought a bloody eight-year war with Iran. Al-Hakim warned repeatedly that the US would face armed resistance if its forces stayed too long after ridding Iraq of Hussein’s regime. Al-Hakim was far less accommodating to coalition interests than al-Khoei and said, “We refuse to put ourselves under the thumb of the Americans or any other country, because that is not in the Iraqis’ interest.”
On 10 April 2003 Shiite Ayatollah Abdul Majid Al-Kohei was assassinated by a knife attack in Najaf after arriving from London. Majid was the son of the late Grand Ayatollah al-Khoei, spiritual leader of Iraq’s Shi’ites at the time of the 1991 Gulf War. Al-Kohei was a moderate and his competition with Grand Ayatollah Al-Hakim (who also headed to Najaf from his base in Iran) would have helped the American occupation. Al-Khoei had a better relationship with the United States, and his quick return to Najaf - with American assistance - was part of the Bush administration’s effort to draw support away from al-Hakim. Although al-Khoei was usually accompanied by coalition forces, the officers do not enter the mosque and so were unable to rescue him. Abdul Majid was stabbed to death at the Imam Ali Mosque in Najaf, one of the holiest shrines for Shi’ite Muslims. The murder raised tensions among Iraq’s majority Shi’ite population. The perception of al-Khoei as a US puppet was strengthened by the subsequent admission by Washington that it had channeled $13 million dollars to him.
On 24 August 2003 a bomb exploded outside the house of Grand Ayatollah Muhammad Said al-Hakim, killing 3 guards and injuring 10 other people. Ayatollah Muhammad Sa`id al-Hakim was slightly wounded in the neck by flying glass when a bomb went off outside his offices in Najaf, shortly after he finished his prayers. Four men in a car dropped a canister of cooking gas near the wall of the house beside the room where the grand ayatollah and his son were resting. Bodyguards noticed a flame coming from the top of the canister before it exploded, killing two of the guards and another household employee. Ten of his aides were wounded. Grand Ayatollah Muhammad Said al-Hakim is the uncle of Ayatollah Mohammed Bakir al-Hakim, the leader of the best-organized Shi’a party, the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq [SCIRI].
Ayatollah Muhammad Sa’id al-Hakim headed one of Iraq’s most powerful clerical families. The family included his nephew Ayatollah Muhammad Baqir al-Hakim, who led the best-organized Iraqi Shi’a group, the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI). The group waged a long guerrilla campaign against deposed leader Saddam Hussein from exile in Iran until the US overthrew the Iraqi regime in April 2003. Subsequently, SCIRI modified its traditional calls for an Islamic system in Iraq and now says it is ready to work toward that goal within a democratic framework. A representative of SCIRI is one of the 25 members of the US-appointed Governing Council in Baghdad.
The bomb attack called new attention to the potentially violent political divides among Iraqi Shi’a organizations. While no one knows who was behind the attack, suspicion in Al-Najaf immediately fell upon political rivals of the al-Hakim family. And those enemies — thanks to the family’s prominence — are numerous.
On 29 August 2003 a car bomb exploded during Friday prayers in Al-Najaf outside the Imam Ali Mosque, killing Ayatollah Muhammad Baqir al-Hakim, the head of the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI), and many others. Over a hundred people were killed, and several times that many were reported to be injured at the mosque, which is the most holy shrine for Shi’ite Muslims in Iraq. There had been considerable unrest among the religious factions in the holy city, 175 kilometers southwest of Baghdad. Al-Hakim was the brother of Abd al-Aziz al-Hakim, who is a member of the Iraqi Governing Council. Baqir al-Hakim, who was 66 years old, returned to Iraq on 10 May after 23 years in exile in Iran.
Shiia Islam
Shi’a Islam (also called Shiite, or Shi’i) is the second largest division of Islam, constituting about 10-15% of all Muslims. The Sunni Muslims recognise the Four Caliphs as ‘rightly guided’, while Shi’a Muslims recognise Ali as the First Caliph and his descendants. Shi’as differ on how many Imams there have been. Some talk of Twelve and others of Fourteen. They also differ on who is the last Imam (Mahdi). Imamites say it was the Twelfth Imam, Muhammad al’Mahdi, the Zaydites say the Fifth, Zayd, and, the Isma’ilites say the Seventh Imam, Ismail. However, Shi’as agree that the Last Imam went into hiding and will return to bring in the end of the world.
Shi’a Beliefs
The five Shia principles of religion (usul ad din) are: belief in divide unity (tawhid); prophecy (nubuwwah); resurrection (maad); divine justice (adl); and the belief in the Imams as successors of the Prophet (imamah). The latter principle is not accepted by Sunnis.
Most Sunnis believe the Sharia (religious law of Islam) was codified and closed by the 10th century. Shia followers believe the Sharia is always open, subject to fresh reformulations of Sunna, hadith, (traditions of what Muhammad and his companions said and did) and Qur’an interpretations.
Like Sunni Islam, Shia Islam has developed several sects. Because of their belief that the leader of the Muslim community must be a blood relative of the prophet, disputes arose when two sons of an Imam (the title given to the Shia leader) both claimed to be the rightful successor. These disputes caused the Shia sect to further divide into three groups: Zaids, Ismai’ilis, and Ithna Asharis. The Twelver or Ithna-Ashari sect is the most important of these, as it predominates not only in Iraq but in the Shia world generally. Broadly speaking, the Twelvers are considered political quietists as opposed to the Zaydis who favor political activism, and the Ismailis who are identified with esoteric and gnostic religious doctrines.
Canonical schools in Islam, are called “Fiqh’s”; the only Fiqh’s in Shia Islam, are Usuli, Akhbari, and Shaykhi. These 3 all belong to the Ithna-Ashari or mainstream Shia Islam, which believes in the 12 Shia Imams; hence the name which means “Twelver’s”. The dominant Shia legal school is sometimes termed the Ja’fari Fiqh, after lmam Jaafar Sadiq (a.s.), the Sixth Infallible Imam of the world of Shiism. The term “Jaafari” is something of a pejorative term, just like “Wahhabiyyah” is; and one that is not used by Shias themselves. It is used by Sunnis, to derided Shias, just as “Wahhabiyyah” is used by Westerners and Shias, to deride Sunnis, but neither term is correct in and of itself.
A student assimilates from very early the ijtihad methodology as he assumes religious ranks: preacher, then mujtahid, hujjat Al-Islam [Proof of Islam], and then hujjat Al-Islam wa Al-Muslimeen until he becomes a Source or ayatollah, and thereafter the great ayatollah or ayatollah al-`uzma.
The 1964 Afghan Constitution, which was the basis of new 2003 constitution, stated: “Islam is the sacred religion of Afghanistan. Religious rites performed by the state shall be according to the provisions of the Hanafi school of jurisprudence.” This stipulation left Afghan Shia without proper representation. Thus in March 2003, Ayatollah Mohammad Asef Mohseni, leader of the predominantly Shia Harakat-e Islami-yi Afghanistan, proposed that, along with the Sunni Hanafi school of jurisprudence, the Shia Ja’fari school of jurisprudence be included in the new constitution as an official sect. Mohseni said he proposed two additional formulas if his proposal is not accepted: mentioning “Islam and the Islamic sects,” or just mentioning Islam without any mention of sects to ensure that Afghan Shia have their jurisprudence recognized and are allowed to “perform their religious duties according to it.”
The Ja’fari [Hafari] fiqh of the Imami Shias is in most cases indistinguishable from one or more of the four Sunni madhahib, except that “Muta’h” or temporary marriage is considered lawful by the Fiqh Jafari, whereas it is prohibited in all the Sunni schools. But the Shia are still viewed with great caution by the Ulema of the Sunni world. Although Sunni and Shi’a Muslims are historically ambivalent, this traditional enmity was dampened in Central Asia due to shared resistance to Russian and Soviet rule. Indeed, both Sunni and Shi’a delegations to the 1905 Third Congress of Muslims in Russia declared Ja’farite Shi’ism as a fifth legal school, equivalent to the Hanafi, Maliki, Hanbali, and Shafi’i madrasehs.
Shi’as do not believe in predestination. They accept the teachings of the Mu’tazilities, a group of Sunni scholars who were later declared heretical. The Mu’tazilities believed that God cannot be responsible for evil, and therefore, humans must have freewill and be independent of God’s authority in this life. A further belief of Shia Muslims concerns divine justice and the individual’s responsibility for his acts, which are judged by a just God. This contrasts with the Sunni view that God’s creation of man allows minimal possibility for the exercise of free will.
Two distinctive and frequently misunderstood Shia practices are mutah, temporary marriage, and taqiyah, religious dissimulation.
Mutah, that is, marriage with a fixed termination contract subject to renewal, was practiced by Muslims as early as the formation of the first Muslim community at Medina. Banned by the second caliph, it has since been unacceptable to Sunnis, but Shias insist that if it were against Islamic law it would not have been practiced in early Islam. Mutah differs from permanent marriage because it does not require divorce proceedings for termination because the contractual parties have agreed on its span, which can be as short as an evening or as long as a lifetime. By making the mutah, a couple places the sexual act within the context of sharia; the act then is not considered adulterous and offspring are considered legitimate heirs of the man.
Taqiyah is another practice condemned by the Sunni as cowardly and irreligious but encouraged by Shia Islam and also practiced by Alawis and Ismailis. A person resorts to taqiyah when he either hides his religion or disavows certain religious practices to escape danger from opponents of his beliefs. Taqiyah can also be practiced when not to do so would bring danger to the honor of the female members of a household or when a man could be made destitute as a result of his beliefs. Because of the persecution frequently experienced by Shia imams, particularly during the period of the Umayyad and Abbasid caliphates, taqiyah has been continually reinforced.
Shia practice differs from that of the Sunnis concerning both divorce and inheritance in that it is more favorable to women. The reason for this reputedly is the high esteem in which Fatima, the wife of Ali and the daughter of the Prophet, was held.
The Imamate
Among Shias the term imam traditionally has been used only for Ali and his eleven descendants. None of the twelve Imams, with the exception of Ali, ever ruled an Islamic government. During their lifetimes, their followers hoped that they would assume the rulership of the Islamic community, a rule that was believed to have been wrongfully usurped. Because the Sunni caliphs were cognizant of this hope, the Imams generally were persecuted during the Umayyad and Abbasid dynasties. Therefore, the Imams tried to be as unobtrusive as possible and to live as far as was reasonable from the successive capitals of the Islamic empire.
The Imamate began with Ali, who is also accepted by Sunni Muslims as the fourth of the “rightly guided caliphs” to succeed the Prophet. Shias revere Ali as the First Imam, and his descendants, beginning with his sons Hasan and Husayn, continue the line of the Imams until the twelfth, who is believed to have ascended into a supernatural state to return to earth on Judgment Day. Shias point to the close lifetime association of the Prophet with Ali. When Ali was six years old, he was invited by the Prophet to live with him, and Shias believe Ali was the first person to make the declaration of faith in Islam. Ali also slept in the Prophet’s bed on the night of the hijra or migration from Mecca to Medina when it was feared that the house would be attacked by unbelievers and the Prophet stabbed to death. He fought in all the battles the Prophet did except one, and the Prophet chose him to be the husband of his favorite daughter, Fatima.
The Sunni-Shia division of Islam originated as a succession dispute shortly after the death of the prophet Muhammad in 632 A.D. Shia believe that the proper successor of Muhammad was Ali. The word “Shia” means partisan or faction of Ali. Ali was elected to be the fourth Muslim ruler or caliph, but was later overthrown and assassinated. Shia Muslims believe that the first three caliphs Abu Bakr, Umar and Uthman were usurpers, and that Ali was the first true Imam.
Shia venerate Ali only second to Muhammad, considering him the first Imam and the true caliph. Ali was buried in the Iraqi city of Najaf, which established an early connection between Iraq and Shiism and became a shrine city that continues to be a destination for Shia pilgrims.
In 661 A.D. Mu’awiya, the governor of Syria, named himself caliph and made the caliphate hereditary in his own family, the Umayyads, who the Shia rejected as usurpers of Ali and his sons’ rights to the caliphate. In the year AD 661, Imam Ali, Muhammad’s son-in-law and the fourth caliph of Islam, was assassinated in southern Iraq in a struggle over who would rule the faithful. Ali was buried in Najaf, and his tomb is housed in a mosque in the city’s center.
Nineteen years after Ali’s death, his two sons were killed in battle and subsequently buried in nearby Karbala. Their battlefield deaths made martyrdom one of the most important tenets of Shiism. Shia attempts to challenge the Umayyad leaders resulted in the death of Ali’s son and the third Shia Imam, Husayn, at the Battle of Karbala in 680. The city of Karbala has become a Shia shrine city.
Husayn’s death is commemorated annually in the Ashura ceremony, and is seen as a symbol of the persecution and oppression experienced by the Shia community. Celebration of Ashura can also be a form of Shia political dissent. Male participants in the Ashura rituals beat their chests and chant in an action called lahtom. Some use swords to lacerate their heads to symbolize the beheading of Husayn, or use chains to beat their backs to evoke the suffering of Husayn.
Shia may place a piece of stone or clay, known as a turba, from the shrine of an Imam or other Shia figure on the ground so that their forehead touches the stone when they prostrate themselves in prayer. The possession of such a disc is a sign of Shia identity.
Jaafari [Jafari] Faith means the Religion according to lmam Jaafar Sadiq (a.s.), the Sixth Infallible Imam of the world of Shiism. Ascription of the Shiite Religion to Imam Jaafar ben Muhammad A]-Sadiq (a.s.) was due to the fact that this noble Imam lived longer than all other Infallible Imams and, thus, he has had more time and opportunity for action. Because of the conditions of his time, the role of imam Sadeq (a.s.) in reviving true, genuine Islamic teachings, formation of numerous education centers and training of faithful men was exceptional to the point that the Shiite religion by ascription to him has been named the “Jaafari Faith”. The infirmity and confusion of the Caliphate due to the clashes between the Abbasid, and the Omayyad dynasties, in particular, afforded wider opportunities to the Imam to teach, instruct, discuss and train the faithful and sincere forces and to establish lbeologic Centers and promulgate the Islamic truths.
During the eighth century the Caliph Mamun, son and successor to Harun ar Rashid, was favorably disposed toward the descendants of Ali and their followers. He invited the Eighth Imam, Reza (A.D. 765-816), to come from Medina (in the Arabian Peninsula) to his court at Marv (Mary in the present-day Soviet Union). While Reza was residing at Marv, Mamun designated him as his successor in an apparent effort to avoid conflict among Muslims. Reza’s sister Fatima journeyed from Medina to be with her brother, but took ill and died at Qom, in present-day Iran. A major shrine developed around her tomb and over the centuries Qom has become a major Shia pilgrimage and theological center.
Mamun took Reza on his military campaign to retake Baghdad from political rivals. On this trip Reza died unexpectedly in Khorasan. Reza was the only Imam to reside or die in what in now Iran. A major shrine, and eventually the city of Mashhad, grew up around his tomb, which has become the most important pilgrimage center in Iran. Several important theological schools are located in Mashhad, associated with the shrine to the Eighth Imam.
Reza’s sudden death was a shock to his followers, many of whom believed that Mamun, out of jealousy for Reza’s increasing popularity, had the Imam poisoned. Mamun’s suspected treachery against Imam Reza and his family tended to reinforce a feeling already prevalent among his followers that the Sunni rulers were untrustworthy.
The Twelfth Imam is believed to have been only five years old when the Imamate descended upon him in A.D.874 at the death of his father. Because his followers feared he might be assassinated, the Twelfth Imam was hidden from public view and was seen only by a few of his closest deputies. Sunnis claim that he never existed or that he died while still a child. Shias believe that the Twelfth Imam never died, but disappeared from earth in about A.D. 939. Since that time, the greater occultation of the Twelfth Imam has been in force and will last until God commands the Twelfth Imam to manifest himself on earth again as the Mahdi or Messiah. Shias believe that during the occultation of the Twelfth Imam, he is spiritually present–some believe that he is materially present as well–and he is besought to reappear in various invocations and prayers. His name is mentioned in wedding invitations, and his birthday is one of the most jubilant of all Shia religious observances.
The Shia doctrine of the Imamate was not fully elaborated until the tenth century. Other dogmas were developed still later. A characteristic of Shia Islam is the continual exposition and reinterpretation of doctrine.
Shia Muslims hold the fundamental beliefs of other Muslims. But, in addition to these tenets, the distinctive institution of Shia Islam is the Imamate — a much more exalted position than the Sunni imam, who is primarily a prayer leader. In contrast to Sunni Muslims, who view the caliph only as a temporal leader and who lack a hereditary view of Muslim leadership, Shia Muslims believe the Prophet Muhammad designated Ali to be his successor as Imam, exercising both spiritual and temporal leadership. Such an Imam must have knowledge, both in a general and a religious sense, and spiritual guidance or walayat, the ability to interpret the inner mysteries of the Quran and the sharia. Only those who have walayat are free from error and sin and have been chosen by God through the Prophet.
Each Imam in turn designated his successor–through twelve Imams–each holding the same powers.
Implied in the Shia principle of the imamah is that imams, are imbued with a redemptive quality as a result of their sufferings and martyrdoms. And, although imams are not divine, they are sinless and infallible in matters of faith and morals, principle very similar to the notion of papal infallibility in the Roman Catholic Church. That man needs an intermediary with God is an Iranian idea that long predates Islam, as is the idea of a savior or messiah (Mahdi) who will come to redeem man and cleanse the world. To expect that the Mahdi, who is the last (twelfth) Imam, really will one is a religious virtue (intizar).
Comments by AdelaMaria, BSP: I respect my brother Muslims and I hope to share the same Heaven that the One True God has created for all of us.
It has recently been brought to my attention that fleeing Iraqi families are escaping with their children to bordering countries. The violence and atrocities against the Iraqui’s are killing sons and daughters. Fathers and mothers are fleeing in hope of finding help, compassion , employment, food from other Muslim countries. However, a news clip that was recently shown on CNNI, revealed something otherwise. I do not know the validity of this news, but, it was extremely painful and sorrowful for me to witness.
A child was shown in either Syria or Iran competing with older women for the favor of being chosen to be a sex object for the highest bidder.
It was stated in this news video, that Iraqi families are starving in those countries and that young daughters are being forced to supplement income by prostituting. A young child was shown rising up from a seated position at the sound of a bell, indulating and dancing in competition with older girls and women; and clients (old men and men of means) bidding for the most innocent and beautiful of the writhing women and children. Men were actually bidding for a child to have sex with!!!
I am asking….”Who’s sin is this?”. The child to be scorned and lost forever according to the religion; or are the men in these countries to be stoned for this crime? Is the world at large guilty for the desecration of the innocence of children? Are a few guilty? Or, are we all for this outrageous, and flagrant disregard for the welfare of the war torn country and its people.?
Can we all point a finger and say…”Oh well, they are barbarians, people of another culture, uncivilized? Then, I ask you, who has the greater sin, the civilized Western world leaders or the Old Country Islamic leaders?
Why are the children suffering for the sins of the Fathers? Why are the countries of the Middle East being raped and plundered in the name of Justice? Who is like God?
This the cry of St. Michael when the Morning Star rose up in defiance of the One True God. Who is like God?
St. Michael….raise your mighty sword and vanquish the blasphemers against the innocence of babies…children…little ones…obedient and unaware of the oncoming pain, humiliation and destruction of their bodies, minds, souls. Who is like God?
Are you weeping Lord? I AM!!!!!